### Collision Attacks on the Reduced Dual-Stream Hash Function RIPEMD-128

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- Motivation
- Description of RIPEMD-128
- Outline of the Attack
- Searching for Differential Characteristics
- 5 Finding a Colliding Message Pair
- Results and Summary


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### Motivation

- Cryptanalysis of ARX based designs is still important
- Very difficult without the right tools
- Even more for dual-stream hash functions.
- Do the results on SHA-2 help to improve attacks on other designs?
- RIPEMD-128: shares some similarities with SHA-2


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
# **Description of RIPEMD-128**



- ISO/IEC standard [DBP96]
- designed by Dobbertin, Bosselaers and Preneel
- iterated, Merkle-Damgård hash function
- dual stream compression function
- no output transformation
- 128-bit hash output


## Step Update Transformation of RIPEMD-128





- one message word updates two state variables
- different message word permutations
- different rotation values and Boolean functions
- no interaction between streams (SHA-2: with interaction)
- 4 rounds of 16 steps

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


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


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### Overview of the Attack




### Overview of the Attack




- choose a good starting point
  - few message word differences
  - high probability characteristic
- search for a characteristics
  - very sparse in R2 and R3
  - sparse in one stream in R1
- determine message pair
  - message modification in R1
  - exhaustive search for R2, R3
  - ⇒ iterations between phases

# Choosing a Starting Point




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- message word 13
  - single local collision (R1-R2)
  - impossible in left stream
- message word 0 and 6
  - left: two short local collisions
  - right: one long local collision
  - avoid overlapping of LCs
  - collision for 38 steps

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### **Differences and Conditions**

#### Generalized Conditions [DR06]

• take all 16 possible conditions on a pair of bits into account

$(X_i, X_i^*)$	(0,0)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(1,1)	$(X_i, X_i^*)$	(0,0)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(1,1)
?	✓	✓	✓	✓	3	✓	✓	-	-
-	✓	-	-	✓	5	✓	-	$\checkmark$	-
х	-	✓	$\checkmark$	-	7	✓	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	-
0	✓	-	-	-	A	-	$\checkmark$	-	✓
u	-	✓	-	-	В	✓	✓	-	✓
n	-	-	✓	-	C	-	-	✓	✓
1	-	-	-	✓	D	✓	-	$\checkmark$	✓
#	-	-	-	-	E	-	✓	✓	✓

#### 2-bit Conditions [MNS11]

- linear relation between closely related bits:  $X_i \oplus X_j = 0/1$
- 2-bit conditions on any generalized condition (-,x,?,...)
- used to determine critical bits (those with many relations)

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- Efficiency
  - not all conditions in every iteration/phase
  - use table lookups when possible

# Search Strategy

### Search Algorithm [DR06, MNS11]

- (1) Start with an unrestricted characteristic ('?' and '-')
- (2) Successively impose new conditions on the characteristic
  - path search: replace '?' by '-' and 'x' by 'n' or 'u'
  - message search: replace '-' by '1' or '0'
- (3) Propagate the conditions in a bitslice manner and check for consistency
  - if a contradiction occurs then backtrack
  - else proceed with step 2
- (4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all bits of the characteristic are determined

# Search Strategy

#### The difficulties are in the details...

- Which information to propagate (and when)?
  - path search: generalized conditions
  - message search: generalized conditions and 2-bit conditions
- Which bits (which area) to guess?
  - dedicated to hash function
  - bits with many 2-bit conditions (in message search)
  - lots of trial and error needed to find best strategy
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
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  - keep and check a list of previous critical bits
- ⇒ Dedicated for every hash function (unfortunately)

## Searching for a Differential Characteristic

- 1	∇Β.	$\nabla B$	$\nabla m_i$
-4			
-3			
-2			
-1			
0	77777777777777777777777777777777		77777777777777777777777777777777
1	7777777777777777777777777777777777		
2	7777777777777777777777777777777777		
3		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
4		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
5		777777777777777777777777777777777777	
6		77777777777777777777777777777777777	77777777777777777777777777777777777
7		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
8		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
9		7777777777777777777777777777777777	
10		777777777777777777777777777777777777	
11		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
12		777777777777777777777777777777777777	
13		77777777777777777777777777777777777	
14		777777777777777777777777777777777777	
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21	77777777777777777777777777777777777		
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
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  - $\bigcirc$  find first block  $M_0$
  - right stream in R1

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- Amortize costs
  - automatic message modification until word 13
  - brute-force with message words 14,15
  - complexity 2<sup>?</sup>



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### Results

#### previous results:

component	attack	steps	complexity	generic	reference
hash	preimage	33	2 <sup>124.5</sup>	2 <sup>128</sup>	[OSS10]
hash	preimage	interm. 35	2 <sup>121</sup>	2 <sup>128</sup>	[OSS10]
hash	preimage	interm. 36	2 <sup>126.5</sup>	2 <sup>128</sup>	[WSK+11]

#### our results:

component	nponent attack		complexity	generic
hash	collision	38	example, 214	2 <sup>64</sup>
hash	near-collision	44	example, 2 <sup>32</sup>	2 <sup>47.8</sup>
hash	hash non-randomness		2 <sup>70</sup>	2 <sup>76</sup>
compression	collision	48	example, 240	2 <sup>64</sup>

### Summary

- Strategy to analyze dual stream hash functions
- Automatic path search and automatic message modification
- Time consuming to find the right settings
- Once settings are found, collision can be found in minutes
- Still lots of work to be done for other (ARX based) hash functions
- Remember: it took 5 years to get from SHA-1 to SHA-2

### References



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